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BE CAREFUL WHERE YOU LIVE WHEN YOU DIE:
TERMINATION OF COPYRIGHT TRANSFERS AND THE
ROAD TO MARRIAGE EQUALITY
R. Anthony Reese*
INTRODUCTION
For more than five decades, gay and lesbian Americans have fought for
equal treatment under the law. That fight has rarely, if ever, been waged
over the provisions of copyright law. Indeed, modern copyright law for the
most part makes no distinctions in how it treats authors based on their
sexual orientation. In recent years, the most prominent aspect of the
campaign for equal rights for gay men and lesbians has been the fight for
marriage equality, and substantial progress has been made toward that goal.
The struggle for marriage equality, though, highlights one aspect of
copyright law—its termination of transfers regime—which has
discriminated against, and continues to discriminate against, gay and lesbian
authors and their partners.
Part I briefly explains the termination provisions of current copyright
law, which were enacted by Congress in 1976 and took effect in 1978.
Using the experience of a hypothetical author, Part II then traces how the
operation of the termination provisions has evolved from 1978 to the
present day. This history shows how at every stage of that evolution
copyright law has treated gay and lesbian authors less favorably than
heterosexual authors. This Part also explains the remaining inequality in
copyright’s termination regime. Part III explains how copyright law’s
discriminatory treatment resembles many of the other instances in which
gay and lesbian couples have suffered unequal treatment under the law, and
also resembles another instance in copyright history of discrimination
against authors’ spouses on the basis of gender. Part IV considers how the
possible outcomes of the Obergefell v. Hodges case in the Supreme Court
this summer could eliminate, reduce, or perpetuate copyright’s current
discrimination against gay and lesbian authors, and looks at a number of
ways to end that discrimination if the Court’s decision does not do so. This
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Part also reveals the international dimension of copyright’s inequality, by
examining the way the law treats authors who live (and die) outside the
United States and notes that achievement of uniform domestic marriage
equality would not remedy that international inequality. Finally, Part V
outlines some practical steps that gay and lesbian authors can take to try to
minimize the discriminatory effect of copyright’s termination regime as
long as it remains.
I.

COPYRIGHT’S TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS REGIME

Copyright law has long included a mechanism by which authors of
copyrighted works who transferred away their copyrights could, after the
passage of time, reclaim ownership of those copyrights.1 This reversion-ofrights mechanism in copyright law is premised on a view that “works that
continue to enjoy commercial value” over a long period of time “are more
likely to owe their success to the genius of their authors than to the capital
and labor contributed by the author’s assignees or licensees” and therefore
“the author has the stronger entitlement to the revenues earned” by the work
in the later years of its copyright term.2 Reversion allows the author who
has reclaimed her copyright to renegotiate new—and potentially more
lucrative—deals with those who wish to use the work after the reversion.
Before 1978, U.S. copyright law allowed ownership of a transferred
copyright to revert to the author (or to the author’s family) by dividing
copyright protection into an initial term and a renewal term and by
providing that if the copyright was renewed, ownership of the renewal term
vested in the author or her statutorily designated successors. The 1976
Copyright Act eliminated the divided-term renewal system in favor of a
unitary term of copyright protection.3 Adopting a unitary term meant that
renewal was no longer available to effectuate reversion of ownership to the
author. The 1976 Act’s drafters, however, believed that reversion was still
desirable.4 So the statute included a new reversion mechanism: the law

1

See generally Lionel Bentley & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the
Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S.
Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1475.
2 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.4, at 5:113 (3d ed. 2005, 2012 Supp.).
3 17 U.S.C. § 302. The 1976 Act retained the renewal system for works that were copyrighted
before its effective date. Id. at § 304(a), (b). H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 139–40.
4 “The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the
present section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24) should be eliminated, and that the proposed
law should substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers. A
provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part
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gives an author (or her statutorily designated successors) the right to
terminate grants of copyright ownership. This provision essentially gives
authors or their successors an opportunity to undo transfers or licenses once
35 years have passed after the grant was made.
The remainder of this Part summarizes the scope and mechanics of
termination, codified in section 203 of the current statute.
Which Grants May be Terminated? Section 203 applies broadly to any
grant of a transfer or an exclusive or nonexclusive license of any copyright
or any copyright right.5 But its application is limited to grants that are
executed by the author, not by any other persons, and only to grants
executed on or after January 1, 1978 and not before.6 In addition, under
Section 203, authors’ grants by will are exempted (so that only inter vivos
transfers are terminable), and termination is not available if the work
involved is a work made for hire.7
Who May Terminate A Grant? The statute dictates who may decide
whether to terminate a grant that is subject to termination. The basic
principle of Section 203 confers the termination right on the author herself.8
If an author is dead, however, the statute specifies who is entitled to
terminate that author’s grants. These provisions will be examined in detail
in Part II, but as originally enacted, the statute essentially vested a deceased
author’s Section 203 termination interest in the author’s surviving spouse
and/or surviving children or grandchildren.9
from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited.” H.R. REP. 94-1476,
at 124.
5 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
6 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). Certain grants of copyright rights made before January 1, 1978, are subject
to termination under a parallel statutory provision. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). The analysis in Part II of how
section 203 applies to authors’ same-sex partners is largely applicable to termination under § 304(c)
as well.
7 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The definition of “work made for hire” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 covers both
employee-prepared works and certain specially commissioned works, and imposes several formal
requirements in order for works in the latter category to qualify. See Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). If a work is made for hire, then U.S. law considers the hiring
party to be the work’s author, and copyright ownership vests ab initio in the hired party, 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b), so that there is no transfer from the employee or independent contractor to the hiring party
that would be subject to Section 203 in any event, but that latter section is nonetheless explicit in
entirely excluding grants in works made for hire from its scope.
8 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1). If the work is jointly authored, and more than one author signed the
grant that is subject to termination, then termination requires a majority of the signers to agree to
terminate. Id. See generally Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606 (S.D.Cal. 2012).
9 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). As discussed below, the statute was amended in 1998 by the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act to allow termination by the author’s “executor, administrator,
personal representative, or trustee” if no spouse, child, or grandchild survives the author. See, infra,
text accompanying notes 31–35.
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Rather complicated provisions govern the proportionate shares of the
termination interest owned by the author’s surviving spouse, children,
and/or grandchildren. If the author leaves only a surviving spouse, the
spouse owns the entire termination interest.10 Similarly, if the author leaves
only surviving children and/or grandchildren, then together they own the
entire termination interest.11 If the author leaves both a surviving spouse
and any surviving children and/or grandchildren, then the surviving spouse
owns 50% of the termination interest, and the surviving issue own the other
50%.12 If more than one person owns the author’s termination interest, the
statute requires that those who “own and are entitled to exercise a total of
more than one-half of that author’s termination interest” must act in order
for the termination to be effected.13
When and How May A Grant Be Terminated? Section 203 provides a
five-year period during which termination may take place.14 Termination
can be effected at any point during that window, which generally begins to
run “at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant.”15 If no termination is effected while the window is open, the transfer
or license continues in force under its own terms.
Those who wish to terminate an eligible grant do so by serving a signed,
written notice of termination upon the grantee (or the grantee’s successor in
title).16 The notice must specify the date during the termination window on
which the termination is to be effective and must be served “not less than
two or more than ten years before that date.”17
Effect of Termination. Once a proper termination is effective, most of
the U.S. copyright rights that were originally conveyed by the author in the
10

17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(B), (C). The interest is “divided among them and exercised on a per
stirpes basis according to the number of such author’s children represented.” Id. at § 203(a)(2)(C).
12 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A)-(C). Again, the interest of the author’s issue is divided and exercised
on a per stirpes basis.
13 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).
14 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
15 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). The statute provides an alternative rule for calculating when the
termination window begins if the grant in question confers “the right of publication” in the work. In
that case, the window opens on the earlier of two dates: the end of thirty-five years from the date of
the work’s publication under the grant, or the end of forty years after the date the grant was executed.
Id. “This alternative method of computation is intended to cover cases where years elapse between
the signing of a publication contract and the eventual publication of the work.” H.R. REP. No. 941476, at 126.
16 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4).
17 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A). A copy of the notice must be recorded in the Copyright Office
before the effective date of termination “as a condition to its taking effect.” Id.
11
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terminated grant revert to the terminating party.18 The terminating party
may then exercise the rights herself, or grant them away again.19 If the work
still retains commercial value after 35 years, the termination mechanism
thus allows the author or her successors to attempt to negotiate a better deal
than the author received in the initial transfer and reap more of the revenues
earned by the work going forward.
II.

THE STORY OF ALISON AND SAM

The termination provisions just summarized are one of the very few
places where copyright law interacts with marriage law, and through this
interaction copyright’s termination provisions have, since taking effect in
1978, treated gay and lesbian authors and their same-sex partners less
favorably than heterosexual authors and their different-sex partners,
although the nature of the inequality has changed over time. This section
details this unequal treatment by tracing the situation of a hypothetical
couple under the law (a) as originally enacted in 1978, (b) as amended in
1998, (c) as applied after 2004 when same-sex couples were first able to
legally marry, and (d) as applied after the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Windsor in 2013.
A. 1995
Consider a hypothetical couple, Alison and Sam, living in Boston in
1995.
Alison and Sam are not married, but they have lived together for five
years. They are financially interdependent, having joint bank accounts,
loans, and property interests. They are each other’s sole partner, they are in

18 17 U.S.C. § 203(b). U.S. rights other than copyright rights, such as, for example, trademark
rights, as well as rights conferred under foreign laws, are not affected by termination. 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(b)(5).
One important limitation on the effect of termination concerns derivative works. If a terminated
grantee prepared a derivative work under the terminated grant before termination occurred, then that
derivative work “may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination.” 17
U.S.C. § 203(b)(1). This limitation makes clear that “this privilege does not extend to the preparation
after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the
terminated grant.” Id. So, for example, if a novelist granted a movie studio the right to make a film
version of her novel and to use the copyright for that purpose during the renewal term, and if the
studio made that film version, and if the novelist later terminates the grant of renewal-term rights to
the studio, the studio may continue to exploit the film version, provided it continues to comply with
the terms of the original grant from the novelist.
19 The statute governs how and when further grants of rights covered by a terminated grant can
be made. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(3), (4).
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a long-term committed relationship, and they intend to remain partners
indefinitely.
Alison is an author, and has just published, to glowing critical reviews
and popular success, a first novel. As a relative unknown before
publication, Alison signed a contract assigning the novel’s copyright to
BigPubCo, a major publishing house, on terms far less lucrative than a more
established novelist would have received.
Alison’s copyright assignment to BigPubCo meets the conditions for
termination under section 203.20 It is an inter vivos transfer of copyright
rights signed by the author after 1977, and Alison’s novel is not a work
made for hire.21 As a result, Alison’s 1995 assignment will be subject to
termination during a five-year window from 2030 to 2035.22 A notice of
termination could be served on BigPubCo as early as 2020 or as late as
2033.23
Alison hopes that her novel will continue to be popular and financially
successful. She knows about copyright law’s termination of transfer
provisions, and she hopes that, when the time comes, terminating the
transfer to BigPubCo will allow her to negotiate a better deal that will
provide an increased financial return to her and to Sam in their later years.
If Alison is still alive when 2020 arrives, she will be the proper party to
serve a notice of termination.24
But in 1995, 2020 is still a long time in the future, and Alison is smart
enough to engage in some estate planning. Alison would like to be sure that,
if she dies before 2020 and Sam survives her, then Sam will be able to
terminate the transfer to BigPubCo and rely on the income from a
renegotiated copyright assignment for financial support. As Alison engages
in her estate planning in 1995, making a valid will leaving her entire estate
to Sam, what could Alison expect as to whether Sam will be able to
terminate the assignment if Alison is already dead when the time comes to
terminate?
Under section 203 as enacted in 1976 and in force in 1995, Sam would
not be able to terminate the assignment to BigPubCo, despite having

20

17 U.S.C. § 203.
17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
22 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). This assumes that the transfer to BigPubCo was “executed” in 1995,
before the novel was published later that year.
23 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4).
24 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).
21
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inherited all of Alison’s estate.25 Section 203 dictates who is entitled to
exercise the termination right if the author is not living while the window
for serving a termination notice is open. In 1995, section 203 provided that
if the author was dead, only the author’s widow or widower, and/or any
surviving children (together with any grandchildren of any deceased child
of the author), could exercise the deceased author’s termination right.26 The
statute defines “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ”27 as the author’s surviving spouse
under state law, so because Alison and Sam are not married, Sam would not
qualify under the statute as an owner of Alison’s termination interest and
would not be able to terminate the assignment to BigPubCo. Indeed, in
1995, if Alison is not married to Sam and has no issue, she should anticipate
that after she dies no one would ever be able to terminate her assignment
under section 203.28
To understand how these termination provisions discriminate against
gay and lesbian authors and their same-sex partners, consider the
implications of section 203 for two different, but nearly identical, versions
of our hypothetical couple. In both versions, Alison is a woman. But in one
version, “Sam” is short for “Samuel” and Alison’s partner is male; in the
other “Sam” is short for “Samantha” and Alison’s partner is female.29
Facially, federal copyright law treats these identically situated different-sex
and same-sex unmarried couples identically. Because each couple is
unmarried, neither Samuel nor Samantha meets the definition of “ ‘widow’
or ‘widower’ ” and thus is not entitled to terminate Alison’s copyright
assignment.
This facially equal treatment, however, hides an underlying inequality.
Copyright law’s definition of “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” turns on whether
the author is survived by a “spouse” as recognized by state law. In 1995,
Alison & Sam’s home state of Massachusetts, like every other state in the
nation at that time, allowed different-sex couples but not same-sex couples

25 This could include all of Alison’s other copyright interests, such as the copyrights in any
unpublished works that Alison has left behind and the contractual right to receive royalty payments
from BigPubCo on the continuing sales of Alison’s first novel.
26 Pub. L. No. 94–553, sec. 101, § 203(a)(2)(A)–(C), 90 Stat. 2541, 2569.
27 17 U.S.C. § 101.
28 The law that became the 1976 Copyright Act was crafted during the twenty-year revision
period, and the first version of the termination provisions proposed during this period allowed
termination by the author’s “legal representatives, legatees, or heirs” if the author was dead when the
time for termination arrived. H.R. 11947 and S. 3008, § 16, 88th Cong. (1964). Had that version been
enacted, Alison could presumably have designated Sam by will as the person able to terminate after
Alison’s death.
29 See, e.g., Dick Gallagher & Mark Waldrop, Sam and Me, WHEN PIGS FLY (RCA Victor 1997).
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to marry.30 So while federal law would bar Alison’s unmarried partner Sam
(of either gender) from acquiring any termination interest, Alison and
Samuel could eliminate that bar at any time simply by getting married,
which they could do under the law of every state in the nation in 1995.
Alison and Samantha, by contrast, could not eliminate the bar by marrying
in any state in the nation in 1995, and Alison would have no path to
ensuring that Samantha, as her survivor, would acquire the right to
terminate Alison’s assignment to BigPubCo if Alison herself did not
survive until the time came to terminate.
Thus, starting in 1978 (when the termination provisions took effect),
federal copyright law, while providing facially equal treatment to authors
with unmarried partners, regardless of the partner’s gender, in fact
incorporated by reference every state law’s unequal treatment of those
authors. If an author had a same-sex unmarried partner, state law would
prevent the author from marrying that partner, and copyright law would
defer to that state-law bar and refuse to recognize the unmarried (and
unmarryable) partner as the author’s survivor for termination purposes.
B. 1998
The situation for Alison remained the same until 1998. That year, as
part of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,31 Congress
amended section 203 and allowed for better treatment for an author’s
unmarried partner. The amendment expanded the statutory list of successors
entitled to terminate a deceased author’s grant, so that if an author dies
without a widow or widower, and without any surviving child or
grandchild, then the deceased author’s termination interest can be exercised
by a survivor designated in the author’s will (or by intestate succession).32
This amendment for the first time allowed an author with an unmarried
partner to designate that partner as entitled to terminate the author’s
copyright grants after the author’s death.
Under the amended version of section 203, what could Alison expect as
to Sam’s ability to terminate Alison’s assignment to BigPubCo if Alison
were to die in 1999? Whether Alison’s partner was Samuel or Samantha,
30 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“When at first Windsor and Spyer
longed to marry, neither New York nor any other State granted them that right.”); Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appeal of 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
31 Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
32
Pub. L. 105-298, § 103, 112 Stat. 2827, 2829 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(D)). The
added subsection provides in full: “In the event that the author’s widow or widower, children, and
grandchildren are not living, the author’s executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee
shall own the author’s entire termination interest.”
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Sam would still not be able to terminate Alison’s assignment as her
“ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” under section 203(a)(2)(A), because Alison and
Sam are still not married under state law. However, if Alison had made a
valid will leaving her termination interest to Sam, then under
§ 203(a)(2)(D), Sam would be entitled to terminate Alison’s assignment.33
An important caveat, however, is that Alison could effectively bequeath
her termination interest to Sam only if Alison is not survived by any child
or grandchild. If Alison had any living children or grandchildren when the
time came to terminate, then under section 203, the surviving child or
grandchild would own the entire termination interest, and Alison’s bequest
of that termination interest to Sam would be ineffective.34 Even if Alison’s
will provided that the termination interest should be equally shared by Sam
and by Alison’s surviving child, the statutory order of succession in favor of
the child would trump. In essence, the statute imposes a compulsory bequest
of the termination interest to the statutorily designated successors—in this
case, the author’s offspring.35
After the 1998 amendment, then, Alison and Sam are better off than
they were before. Alison can provide Sam with the opportunity to terminate
the BigPubCo assignment, at least if Alison has the foresight to bequeath
the termination interest to Sam, expends the time and resources necessary to
do so, and has no surviving children. But Alison and Samantha are still
worse off than Alison and Samuel. While both couples are in the same
position as long as they are unmarried, Alison and Samuel can still marry at
any time under the laws of every state. And marrying offers the differentsex couple at least two advantages. First, Alison can ensure that Samuel will
be able to terminate her assignment after her death without the expense of
creating a will or trust. Second, marrying ensures that Samuel will own at
least half of the termination interest even if Alison is survived by any
children or grandchildren, because section 203 provides that if the author
leaves both a widower and any issue, then the widower owns half of the
termination interest and the children and/or grandchildren own the
33 Alison could presumably leave her termination interest to Sam either by a specific bequest of
that interest or by leaving her entire estate to Sam.
34 Alison’s children or grandchildren might, of course, choose to share any proceeds from the
termination with Samantha as Alison’s surviving partner, but they would be under no obligation to do
so. And even surviving spouses and children who legally share the termination interest do not always
enjoy a harmonious relationship. See, e.g., Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d
Cir. 2008) (involving dispute over termination between author’s surviving spouse and author’s
surviving children from a previous marriage).
35 See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956) (describing parallel provisions in the
1909 Act governing entitlement to secure a renewal copyright as “tak[ing] the form of a compulsory
bequest of the [renewal] copyright to the [statutorily] designated persons.”).
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remaining half. Alison and Samantha still cannot obtain those advantages,
because they cannot legally marry anywhere in the country.
The 1998 amendment thus somewhat ameliorated copyright law’s
unequal treatment of an author’s same-sex unmarried partner. The basic
framework remained the same. Federal copyright law treated authors’
unmarried partners, regardless of gender, as equally unable to qualify as a
“ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” entitled to exercise the deceased author’s
termination right, while incorporating by reference the laws of all 50 states
that allowed authors to marry their different-sex partners but prevented
them from marrying their same-sex partners. But copyright now offered an
author with an unmarried (and unmarryable) same-sex partner an alternative
mechanism to allow the partner to exercise the author’s termination interest
after the author’s death: leaving the interest to the partner by will.36 That
mechanism is an imperfect substitute for statutory status as a “ ‘widow’ or
‘widower.’ ” It requires advance planning by the author, and even with such
planning it will only be available if the author has no surviving children.
But it is nonetheless an advance over the situation of the previous twenty
years, when an author had no means whatsoever to provide for her
surviving same-sex partner to be able to exercise her termination interest
after her death.
C. 2004
The next important development in the story of Alison and Sam
occurred in 2004. Copyright law recognizes as a “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ”
only an author’s spouse under state law, and until then state law only
allowed different-sex couples to marry. Alison and Samuel could get
married at any time and thereby qualify Samuel as Alison’s “spouse,” while
Alison and Samantha could not do so. But in 2004, Alison and Sam’s home
state of Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex couples to
marry.37 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled on November

36

The provision would also appear to allow an author to leave her termination interest to her
same-sex partner by means of a will substitute, such as a trust, given the language allowing
termination by the author’s “executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee.”
37 The issues raised in this section could have arisen earlier, as some foreign jurisdictions
allowed same-sex couples to marry before Massachusetts did. The Netherlands legalized same-sex
marriage effective in 2001, and Belgium and three Canadian provinces followed in 2003. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. AND DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE
LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 84 (2006). As discussed in Part IV.C., infra, the Copyright Act’s
definition of “widow or widower” looks to the law of the author’s domicile to determine whether an
author is married, and the termination right appears to apply equally to assignments of U.S. rights by
foreign authors, whose marriage would be subject not to the jurisdiction of any American state, but of
the nation (and potentially the subdivision of the nation) in which they reside. I am not aware of any
attempted terminations by a same-sex spouse of a deceased foreign-domiciled author after 2001.
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18, 2003, that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the
commonwealth’s constitution.38 On May 17, 2004, same-sex couples began
to marry in Massachusetts.39 From that date forward, Alison and Samantha
could marry in their state, just as Alison and Samuel could.
If Alison and Samantha did marry in Massachusetts in 2004, how would
that affect the possible termination of Alison’s assignment to BigPubCo if
Samantha survived Alison? Prior to 2004, the Copyright Act’s
incorporation by reference of state marriage law effectively incorporated
only state marriage law that treated same-sex couples unequally, since no
state allowed same-sex couples to marry. But with the watershed change in
Massachusetts law, the federal Copyright Act now incorporated not only the
unequal marriage laws of most American states, but also the equal
treatment of Massachusetts marriage law. Once Alison and Samantha were
legally married in Massachusetts, if Alison were to die before exercising her
termination interest, then Samantha would qualify as Alison’s “widow” for
purposes of section 203(a)(2)(A), because she would be Alison’s surviving
spouse under Massachusetts law. Regardless of whether Alison had a will
(or whether that will left the termination interest to Samantha), Samantha
would own Alison’s termination interest—she would either solely own 100
percent of the termination interest (if Alison left no surviving kids or
grandkids) or she and Alison’s surviving children (and possibly
grandchildren) would collectively own the termination interest (with
Samantha owning a 50 percent share).40 Copyright law would now truly
treat authors’ unmarried partners equally, regardless of gender, at least in
Massachusetts (though not anywhere else in the United States). In the
absence of a bequest by Alison, neither Samantha nor Samuel would be
entitled to terminate Alison’s assignment if not married to Alison, but
under Massachusetts law Alison could freely marry either Samantha or
Samuel and thereby turn her unmarried partner (of either gender) into her
“spouse” for purposes of copyright law.
This advance toward equality under copyright law for gay and lesbian
authors and their same-sex partners was not, however, as effective as at first
appears. In fact, even after Massachusetts permitted same-sex marriage,
Samantha and Samuel were not treated equally for copyright termination
purposes. Massachusetts marriage law and federal copyright law were not
the only relevant legal provisions determining ownership of the termination

38

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 1,
44–45 (2005).
40 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(A)–(C).
39
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right. Alison and Samantha’s rights were also governed by another federal
law, the so-called “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA).41 DOMA was
enacted in 1996, motivated by the possibility at the time that Hawai’i would
permit same-sex marriage.42 Section 3 of DOMA added the following
language to Title 1 of the United States Code:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, . . . the word
“marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.43
As a result, while federal copyright law would treat Samantha and
Samuel equally with respect to Alison’s termination right, federal noncopyright law, in the form of section 3 of DOMA, would override both
Massachusetts’s equal treatment of its own same-sex residents and
copyright law’s statutory recognition of that equal treatment. Because
DOMA required reading the term “spouse” in Title 17’s definition of
“widow or widower” to encompass only “a person of the opposite sex”,
Samantha would not qualify under federal law as Alison’s spouse for
purposes of determining ownership of the right to terminate Alison’s
copyright assignment after Alison’s death—even though the law of Alison
and Samantha’s home state recognized Samantha as Alison’s spouse and
the copyright statute looks to that state law to determine whether Alison has
a widow or widower. By enacting DOMA, Congress essentially barred
copyright law from treating authors’ same-sex and different-sex partners
equally, even when the authors and their partners were legally married
under state law.44
Section 3 of DOMA meant Massachusetts’ decision to allow same-sex
couples to marry starting in 2004 had no practical effect on Alison and
Samantha with respect to copyright’s termination interest. Even though they
could now legally marry in Massachusetts, Alison and Samantha remained
in the same position they had been in since 1998: Samantha could not
qualify as Alison’s “widow” in order to acquire the termination right under
section 203(a)(2)(A), and so could only acquire the right through Alison’s
will (if she had one), and only if Alison left no surviving children or
41

110 Stat. 2419.
United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___ 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013).
43 1 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added) (held unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S.
___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)).
44
See Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghosts and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 102, 105 (2014); Alvin Deutsch & Jeremey A. Schachter, Gay
Right to Terminate Under the 1976 Copyright Act, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 275, 287–289
(2013).
42
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grandchildren. DOMA allowed copyright law to incorporate by reference
the state-law unequal treatment of same-sex couples in 49 states, but
prevented it from incorporating by reference Massachusetts’ equal
treatment of such couples.
D. 2013
In 2013, the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor45 held that
section 3 of DOMA violated the equal protection guarantee of the U.S.
constitution. In striking down this part of DOMA, the Supreme Court
eliminated the overlay of inequality that law had imposed on copyright law.
As a result, if Alison and Samantha were legally married in
Massachusetts—or in any of the 12 other jurisdictions that allowed samesex marriage when the Court decided Windsor46—then in the event of
Alison’s death, Samantha would meet the copyright act’s definition of
“widow” and would own at least half of Alison’s termination interest under
section 203(a)(2)(A). Copyright law would now treat Alison and Samantha
just as it treated Alison and Samuel.
Of course, this equal treatment is not yet available nationwide. Many
states in the nation do not allow same-sex couples to marry and do not
recognize same-sex marriages entered into elsewhere.47 So, for example, an
author and her same-sex partner who live in Georgia, which does not allow
the couple to legally marry,48 would be in the same position Alison and
Samantha were in before 2004 in Massachusetts: the author’s partner
couldn’t qualify as her “widow.”
The lack of uniform equal treatment for same-sex couples under state
marriage laws creates complications for questions of marital status,
including those in copyright law. If a same-sex couple from Georgia travels
to Massachusetts, marries there, and then returns home to Georgia, are they
married in Georgia? Indeed, what if Alison and Sam, having married in
Massachusetts, decide in 2015 as they near their 60s to move to Atlanta?
(Many couples from the Northeast retire to the warmer climes of the
Southeast, after all.) Can Alison still expect that if she dies before the time
comes to terminate, Sam, as her spouse, will be able to exercise her
termination interest and potentially enjoy a more financially secure
retirement?
45

___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (noting that at the
time of the decision New York and “11 other states and the District of Columbia” allowed same-sex
couples to marry).
47 See text accompanying notes 91–92.
48 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1(a)–(b); Georgia Constitution, art. I, § IV, para. I(a)–(b).
46
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These situations present a classic conflict of laws problem.49 The law of
the state where the couple entered into the marriage (the state of
celebration) treats the couple as validly married. The law of the state where
the couple now lives (the state of domicile) would not allow the couple to
marry. Determining whether the couple qualifies as married requires
choosing which law governs—the law of the state of celebration or of the
state of domicile? Of course, just because Alison and Samantha could not
enter into a marriage in Georgia does not mean that Georgia would
necessarily not recognize the couple as married. It has long been common
for the state in which a couple lives to recognize the couple as validly
married if the couple’s marriage was valid under the law of the state where
it was celebrated, even though the couple could not have legally gotten
married in the state in which they now live. States often choose to apply the
law of the state of celebration, rather than their own law as the state of
domicile, in determining whether a couple is married.50 But this traditional
generosity to recognizing out-of-state marriages has not so far generally
been extended to marriages of same-sex couples (at least in states that do
not themselves allow such couples to marry). Instead, same-sex married
couples who relocate may face difficulties under the traditional view that
their new state of domicile will not recognize a marriage entered into
elsewhere if doing so would violate a strong public policy of that state.51
Many states now have express legal provisions (usually enacted in the last
two decades) barring recognition of marriages of same-sex couples
performed in other jurisdictions.52

49

A robust literature on the question of same-sex marriage and conflict of laws has developed
over the last twenty years. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Mark Strasser, For Whom the
Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, U. CINCINNATI L.
REV. 339 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76
TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws
Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195 (2005); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in
Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215 (2005); Steve Sanders, The
Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421 (2012).
50 See, e.g., CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 277 (2010).
51 Id. See also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76
TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998).
52 See, e.g., Harry Anastopulos, Jurisdictional Russian Roulette: The Intersection of Comity,
Family Security, and Access to Same-Sex Divorce, 14 GEO. J. OF GENDER & L. 133, 144–45 (2013)
(“Forty . . . states enacted explicit language into their state constitutions or statutes that prohibits
recognition of valid out-of-state same-sex marriages.”) (listing state provisions); Andrew Koppelman,
Recognition and Enforcement of Same-Sex Marriage, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 2143, 2140 (2005)
(“Forty states have laws on the books declaring that they will not recognize foreign same-sex
marriages and that such marriages are contrary to their public policy.”).
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The result is that even with the advent of marriage equality in
Massachusetts and other states, and even with the invalidation of section 3
of DOMA, copyright law still treats Alison and Samantha and Alison and
Samuel unequally in these circumstances. This is because for purposes of
defining “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ”, the current copyright statute expressly
chooses which law to look to in determining who qualifies as an author’s
widow or widower for termination purposes. The statute defines the
author’s “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” as “the author’s surviving spouse under
the law of the author’s domicile at the time of his or her death.”53 This
choice-of-law rule represents a remaining inequality in copyright law even
for authors legally married to their same-sex partners.54 It means that if
Alison wishes to be sure that Samantha will be able to terminate Alison’s
copyright assignments in the event that Alison predeceases Sam, then
Alison must be careful where she lives (and is domiciled) when she dies.
If Alison and Samantha move from Massachusetts to Atlanta, they
become domiciled in Georgia. If Alison dies while they are domiciled there,
then in determining who, if anyone, is Alison’s widow or widower for
copyright purposes, the statute mandates looking to Georgia law to decide
who, if anyone, is Alison’s “surviving spouse.” For purposes of section
203(a)(2)(A), then, what will determine Samantha’s status is not the law of
Massachusetts, the state where her marriage to Alison was legally
celebrated (and where Alison and Sam were domiciled when they were
married), but rather the law of Georgia, where Alison was domiciled at the
time of her death.
Georgia, by both statute55 and constitutional provision,56 both does not
allow same-sex couples to marry and does not recognize marriages of samesex couples performed elsewhere.57 As a result, Samantha will not qualify
under Georgia law as Alison’s surviving “spouse”, and therefore she will
not qualify under federal copyright law as Alison’s “widow.” Once again,
only if Alison has bequeathed her termination interest to Samantha (and not

53

17 U.S.C. § 101.
See Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghosts and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 102, 106 (2014).
55 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1(a)–(b).
56 Georgia Constitution, art. I, § IV, para. I(a)–(b).
57 Current understandings of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause would not likely
compel Georgia to recognize Massachusetts’ valid marrying of Alison and Samantha, and section 2
of DOMA explicitly provides that “states are not required to recognize same-sex marriages from
other states.” William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STANFORD
L. REV. 1371, 1390-92 (2012).
54
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left any surviving issue) will Samantha be able to terminate Alison’s
assignment to BigPubCo.
By contrast, if Alison and Samuel marry in Massachusetts, Samuel will
be recognized as Alison’s spouse not only by Massachusetts, but also by
any other state to which they might move. Every state in the U.S. generally
recognizes marriages performed between different-sex couples in every
other state.58 If Alison and Samuel move to Atlanta, then Georgia will
recognize their Massachusetts marriage as valid and will recognize Samuel
as Alison’s surviving spouse if Alison dies. Samuel will therefore qualify
under section 203 as Alison’s “widower” and will automatically own either
half or all of the interest in terminating Alison’s assignment to BigPubCo.
Again, copyright law continues to treat an author’s same-sex partner
worse than it treats an author’s different-sex partner. Alison and Samantha
can expect the same treatment as Alison and Samuel only if they are careful
to make their home in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage. If Alison
dies domiciled in a state (such as Massachusetts or New York) that
recognizes her marriage to Samantha, then federal copyright law will
recognize Samantha as Alison’s widow and the owner of at least half of
Alison’s termination interest. But if Alison dies domiciled in a state, such as
Georgia, that does not recognize her legal marriage to Samantha, then
federal copyright law will not recognize Alison and Samantha’s marriage,
even though it was legal in the state where it was celebrated. In these
circumstances, copyright law will not treat Samantha as Alison’s widow,
but instead will treat her as a legal stranger to Alison, without any claim by
marriage to be able to exercise Alison’s termination interest. Even after the
Windsor Court struck down section 3 of DOMA, copyright law’s choice-oflaw rule for marriage recognition continues to incorporate by reference
state-law unequal treatment of same-sex couples. After nearly four decades,
copyright law treats Alison and Samantha much better than it did when the
1976 Copyright Act took effect on January 1, 1978, but it still does not treat
them as well as it treats Alison and Samuel.

58

See note 50, supra. There may be some non-gender related reasons why one state would not
recognize a marriage performed in another state—e.g., degree of consanguinity—but those would
apply equally to Alison and Samuel and Alison and Samantha if the two parties in each marriage
were related in the same degree.
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III. COPYRIGHT TERMINATION & MARRIAGE INEQUALITY IN CONTEXT
A. Same-Sex Couples and Marital Benefits Generally
The inequality of copyright’s termination provisions is worth
understanding simply because it imposes disadvantages on authors with
same-sex partners (and on those partners) that it does not impose on
different-sex couples. But the history of the termination provisions also
offers a useful example of the spectrum of inequalities that same-sex
couples have faced because of discriminatory marriage laws. The unequal
treatment that Alison and Samantha have faced with respect to termination
of transfers over the last three decades is in no way unique to copyright law,
but is instead representative of the ways that unequal marriage laws limit or
deny benefits to same-sex couples that are available to their similarly
situated different-sex counterparts.
Many benefits are available only to married partners (or surviving
spouses), and when a couple cannot get married under state law, those
benefits are simply unavailable. For example, Social Security survivors
benefits are available only to the widow or widower of a deceased worker
who has earned enough credits to qualify. If a same-sex couple like Alison
and Samantha cannot get married, then if Alison dies, Samantha cannot
qualify as her “widow” in order to obtain those survivors benefits.59
Similarly, preferential treatment for surviving spouses under the federal
estate tax requires that the survivor and the deceased have been legally
married,60 so unmarried surviving partners do not qualify. For these
benefits, if Alison and Samantha cannot marry, they are in the same
position as they were with respect to copyright termination from 1978 until
1998: the only way to obtain the benefit was to be married, and marriage
was universally unavailable.
Same-sex couples simply have no way to obtain marital benefits such as
Social Security benefits or preferential estate-tax treatment if they cannot
marry. Other marital benefits are available only to married couples, but
unmarried same-sex couples may be able to engage in private ordering to
achieve a result that approximates the benefit. For example, if a married
person dies without a will, state intestacy law generally provides that the
deceased person’s spouse will inherit all or a portion of the decedent’s

59 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), (f) (establishing widow’s and widower’s insurance benefits,
respectively); 42 U.S.C. § 416(c), (g) (defining “widow” and “widower,” respectively). This
inequality has been true for many decades. See, e.g., E. CARRINGTON BOGGAN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF
GAY PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK 119–120 (1975).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608130

18

R. Anthony Reese

[18-May-15

property.61 If a same-sex couple cannot get married, then the decedent’s
survivor will not qualify as a surviving spouse and will not be entitled to
inherit under state intestacy law.62 However, each person in a same-sex
couple can make a legally valid will leaving all or a portion of her property
to the other, so that upon that person’s death, the decedent’s survivor will
inherit under the will, even though the surviving partner would not inherit
through intestate succession. This private ordering solution is not
completely equivalent to the state-law benefit of spousal intestate
succession. It requires the couple to take affirmative action (and expend the
time and resources necessary) to make a will. It leaves open the possibility
that the will could be successfully challenged, thereby defeating the
decedent’s intent to leave property to the surviving partner, who would have
no recourse to intestate succession in the absence of a valid will.63 But the
private ordering solution does give the same-sex couple in many
circumstances a means to obtain an approximation of the benefits otherwise
available only to married couples.
This, of course, is the position that unmarried Alison and Samantha
were in with respect to copyright termination once Congress in 1998
amended the copyright statute and allowed an author to specify by will who
should inherit the termination interest if the author dies without any
surviving spouse, child, or grandchild. Alison and Samantha were not as
well-positioned as if they were legally married (and recognized as such),
since Alison’s will cannot validly convey any termination interest to Sam if
any child or grandchild survives Alison. But the couple was better off than
they were before 1998, since they now had a private-ordering mechanism
that allowed Alison, at least in some circumstances, to leave to Sam the
interest in terminating her transfer to BigPubCo.
When Alison and Samantha married in Massachusetts in 2004, but had
federal recognition of that marriage denied by DOMA so that Samantha
would not qualify under Section 203 as Alison’s widow for purposes of
copyright termination, this too was not specific to copyright law, but instead
simply reflected the more general unequal treatment facing legally married
same-sex couples under federal law at the time. DOMA’s “comprehensive
61

See, e.g., California Probate Code § 6401.
In some jurisdictions, over some of the period of time in question, same-sex partners could
enter into a domestic partnership and state law would recognize a decedent’s surviving domestic
partner on equal terms with a decedent’s spouse for purposes of intestate succession. See, e.g.,
California Probate Code § 6401. For an insightful history and analysis of California’s domestic
partnership provisions, see Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 112–154 (2014).
63 See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225 (1981).
62
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definition of marriage for purposes of all federal statutes and other
regulations or directives covered by its terms . . . control[led] over 1,000
federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of
federal law.”64 The Supreme Court in Windsor noted that “[a]mong the over
1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are
laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions,
copyright, and veterans’ benefits.”65 The Court gave just a partial list of the
benefits and responsibilities that DOMA denied to married same-sex
couples:
Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by
reason of government decree, in visible and public ways. By its great reach,
DOMA touches many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to
the profound. It prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining
government healthcare benefits they would otherwise receive. It deprives
them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special protections for domestic-support
obligations. It forces them to follow a complicated procedure to file their state
and federal taxes jointly. It prohibits them from being buried together in
veterans’ cemeteries.66

Thus, if Alison and Samantha married in Massachusetts, their inability to
ensure that Samantha would be able to exercise the termination interest if
she survived Alison was simply one of the many federal benefits denied to
the married couple pursuant to DOMA.
Finally, even after Windsor struck down section 3 of DOMA, when
copyright law now continues not to recognize Samantha as Alison’s spouse
as long as the couple lives in a state that does not recognize their marriage,
even this unequal treatment is not unique to copyright law. For the most
part, in the wake of Windsor, the federal government has moved to treat
legally married same-sex couples and different-sex couples equally
regardless of where they live. As Attorney General Eric Holder wrote in a
June 2014 memorandum to the president regarding the implementation of
the Windsor decision, federal
“[a]gencies have overwhelmingly chosen to recognize marriages as valid
based on the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place (the ‘place
of celebration’), regardless of where the couple currently resides (the ‘place of
domicile’). Given that a majority of states still do not allow or recognize
same-sex marriages, this issue often determines whether the federal
government can provide marriage-dependent benefits to all same-sex married
couples, including those who live in non-recognition states. . . . Many

64

United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2683.
United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2694 (emphasis added).
66 United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2694 (citations omitted).
65
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agencies had not previously established a standard for marriage recognition,
and almost all have now adopted place of celebration rule for programspecific reasons.”67

For example, the Internal Revenue Service has adopted a rule “recognizing
a marriage of same-sex individuals that was validly entered into in a state
whose laws authorize the marriage of two individuals of the same sex even
if the married couple is domiciled in a state that does not recognize the
validity of same-sex marriages.”68
Nevertheless, the copyright statute is not the only area of federal law
where the federal government does not treat same-sex couples equally when
they live in a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage. As Holder
noted, “[t]wo agencies are prohibited by federal statute from adopting a
place of celebration rule for certain programs of critical importance to
millions of Americans. The Social Security Administration and the
Department of Veterans Affairs are required by law to confer certain
marriage related benefits based on the law of the state in which the married
couple resides or resided, preventing the extension of benefits to same-sex
married couples living in states that do not allow or recognize same-sex
marriages.”69
The hurdles that same-sex couples have faced, and continue to face, in
obtaining various spousal benefits arise in large part because those benefits
are tied to marriage. Many legal regimes confer privileges on married
persons that are unavailable to the unmarried. Decoupling benefits and
privileges from marriage would reduce many of these hurdles. For example,
if a worker can designate any person of her choice as her survivor for
receiving Social Security benefits after her death, then the marital status of
the worker and her same-sex partner becomes much less practically
significant.
In the case of copyright’s termination provisions (and in the renewal
provisions that preceded them), though, Congress used marriage (and
parentage) very deliberately as a way to prevent transferees from
circumventing the reversionary effect of termination. As discussed in Part I,
a substantial purpose behind these provisions is to allow an author (or a
deceased author’s successors) to reclaim a transferred copyright and try to
renegotiate a better deal for further use of the copyrighted work.
Effectuating reversion becomes much harder if the author can simply
67 Eric Holder, Jr., Memorandum to the President: Implementation of United States v. Windsor
at 3 (Jun. 20, 2014) (hereinafter “Holder Memo”).
68 Rev. Rul. 2013–17, 2013–38 I.R.B. 201, 204.
69 Holder Memo, supra note 67, at 3.
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transfer the termination interest to any other party. To return to the
hypothetical introduced in Part II, if Alison’s future termination interest
were freely transferrable, then BigPubCo might well have demanded as part
of its 1995 contract with Alison that she grant the company not only the
copyright in her novel but also her termination interest. Because this would
defeat the reversionary purpose of the termination provisions, Congress
made an author’s termination right inalienable.70
The mandatory statutory designation of who may terminate an author’s
transfer after the author’s death similarly uses marriage (and parentage) to
protect against attempts to circumvent reversion by termination. If Alison
could simply designate by will who is entitled to terminate after her death,
then BigPubCo could have demanded, as part of the 1995 contract, that
Alison agree to make a will leaving the termination interest to BigPubCo,
and no termination would be possible if Alison died before the time to
terminate arrived. The statute prevents such attempts to defeat the reversion
of a deceased author’s copyright interests by disregarding an author’s
testamentary disposition of her termination interest whenever the author left
a surviving spouse, child, or grandchild. Tying the termination right to
marriage helps keep transferees from circumventing termination’s
reversionary effect, but it has disadvantaged gay and lesbian authors who
have generally been unable to marry their same-sex partners.
The various ways in which copyright’s termination provisions have over
time discriminated against authors in same-sex relationships (and their
partners) are thus a microcosm of the history of modern unequal treatment
of same-sex couples. And the evolution of how same-sex couples have
fared under the termination provisions from 1978 to today shows that while
substantial progress has been made on the journey toward full marriage
equality, this journey is not yet complete.
B. Copyright Reversion and Marital Status
Just as copyright’s termination provisions are not unique in treating
same-sex couples unequally, those provisions do not mark the only instance
in which copyright law’s reversion mechanism has interacted with marriage
law in a way that discriminated against some authors.
As noted in Part I, before the 1976 Copyright Act adopted the
termination of transfers provision, copyright’s renewal system enabled
copyright ownership to revert to an author who had transferred it away. A
copyright subsisted for an initial term, at the end of which a renewal term of
70 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (“Termination . . . may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to
the contrary . . .”).
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copyright could be secured. The general rule for most of U.S. history was
that the author was the party entitled to secure the renewal. Starting in 1831,
the statute specified who could renew a deceased author’s copyright. In
1831, the statute provided that if the author, “being dead, shall have left a
widow, or child, or children,” then any renewal copyright in the dead
author’s work could be obtained by “such widow and child, or children.”71
The 1870 Copyright Act similarly granted the renewal copyright to “the
author . . . if he be still living . . . or his widow or children, if he be dead.”72
Although there appears to be no judicial decision on the question, in the
view of at least some early twentieth-century commentators73 and
legislators,74 the statutory reference to “widow” encompassed only the
surviving female spouse of a deceased male author, and meant that a
deceased female author’s widower—her surviving male spouse—was not
entitled to renew the copyright in his deceased wife’s works under the 1831
and 1870 acts.75
Indeed, this issue surfaced in the legislative debates leading up to the
adoption of the 1909 Copyright Act, and the debate suggests that the
statutory term “widow” was seen as excluding “widowers” from the right to
renew. In 1906, Congress considered bills that would have made it possible,
for works copyrighted prior to the bills’ enactment, to “extend” the
subsisting copyright so that the work’s entire copyright term would last for
the author’s life plus 50 years.76 Such a subsisting copyright could be
71

1831 Copyright Act, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
1870 Copyright Act, § 88, 16 Stat. 212; see also 60 Rev. Stat. § 4954 (1873),
73 SAMUEL J. ELDER, OUR ARCHAIC COPYRIGHT LAWS 19 (1903) (“[I]f the author be a woman no
right of renewal is given her husband.”); Samuel J. Elder, Duration of Copyright, 14 YALE L.J. 417
(1905) (“The renewal right does not extend to a husband . . .”); 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT M58 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman ed. & comp. 1976) (Some
Miscellaneous amendments to S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 proposed to the Copyright Office) (proposal
of Edmund A. Whitman) (“I have never been able to understand why the present act excludes the
husband, and I see the new Act contains the exclusion.”). At least one later commentator also read the
nineteenth-century acts this way. Theodore R. Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright—Section 23 of the
Copyright Act of 1909, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 712, 717 n. 29 (1944) (“[O]nly the widow was provided
for [in the 1831 and 1870 acts]. The male of the species did not receive consideration until the present
act.”).
74 H.R. REP. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907) at 13 (“This renewal right [under present law]
does not extend to a husband.”); see also H.R. REP. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess (1909) at 15.
75 The statutory language would appear to allow any surviving children of a deceased female
author to secure the renewal copyright under the 1831 and 1870 acts, even though the author’s
widower apparently could not have done so. Those statutes did not, however, provide for renewal by
any other of the author’s survivors or testamentary beneficiaries.
76 Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives,
Conjointly on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright 59th
Cong. 10 (1906) (§ 18(c) (granting life-plus-50 term to works created after the bills’ enactment), § 19
(granting option to extend subsisting copyrights for a term equal to that granted to newly created
72
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extended “by the author, if he be still living, or if he be dead, leaving a
widow, by his widow, or in her default or if no widow survive him, by his
children, if any survive him.”77 In hearings on the bills, Arthur Steuart,
chair of the American Bar Association’s copyright committee, noted the
gendered language of the statute and suggested amending it:
Some one has with some degree of propriety suggested that in this
day, when many of our most distinguished authors are ladies, it is hardly
fair to the husbands to draw an act providing for an extension for the
benefit of widows only. If the act is to be logical and you gentleman are
husbands and you are going to draw an act for your own benefit, you
had better provide for widowers as well as widows.78
Steuart’s suggestion seems to have been followed, as subsequent bills that
retained the extension provision allowed either a widow or a widower to
secure the extension.79 Given that the gendered language of the proposed
bills paralleled that of the 1831 and 1870 acts, the reading that this language
would not encompass the widower of a deceased female author would seem
to apply equally to those acts’ renewal provisions.
Congress did not adopt the life-plus-50 term provisions discussed in the
1906 hearings, and instead the 1909 Copyright Act retained the existing
renewal system. But Congress did eliminate the gender distinction in the
statute, providing that a renewal copyright could be secured by “the author
. . . if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the
author be not living.”80 But for nearly 80 years from 1831 to 1909,

works)). For the background on these bills and the extension provision discussed herein, see Barbara
Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (STUDY NO. 31) 149–50 in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 29–31 (Comm. Print
1961).
77 Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives,
Conjointly on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright 59th
Cong. 11 (1906) (§ 19).
78 Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives,
Conjointly on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright 59th
Cong. 173 (1906) (statement of Arthur Steuart). Some discussion following this remark included one
witness indicating “I think the use of the word ‘widow’ included both sexes originally,” but the
discussion was inconclusive on the point. Id. at 174.
79 Barbara Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (STUDY NO. 31) 150 & n. 313 in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 29–31
(Comm. Print 1961).
80 Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976). The statute
also provided for renewal by “the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin” if
the author was not survived by either a spouse or any children. Id. This renewal system applied to
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copyright law, by statute, appears to have treated female authors less
favorably than male authors. If a female author died before the time came to
renew the copyright in her work and left a surviving husband, that husband,
as the author’s widower, would not have been able to secure a renewal term
of copyright and enjoy whatever financial success the work might have in
its renewal term.
The copyright statute’s facially different treatment of male and female
authors between 1831 and 1909 seems consistent with what Justice Brennan
later described as an “attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical
effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”81 He noted that “[a]s a
result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes,”82 of which
copyright’s renewal provision was apparently one example. The gender
distinction in the pre-1909 renewal provisions fits comfortably with
stereotypes of husbands as wage-earners and wives as their dependents: the
statute treats such presumably dependent surviving female widows more
favorably than such presumably wage-earning surviving male widowers.
But, of course, the provision disadvantages female authors. A female
author’s inability to leave her renewal interest to her surviving husband was
not the most significant form of sex discrimination she faced at a time when
women, among other things, could not vote or serve on juries,83 but for
some successful female authors it might have had a substantial economic
impact.
The history of copyright’s reversion provisions, and the legal landscape
for same-sex couples over the last several decades, show that the
discrimination against gay and lesbian authors and their partners embodied
in copyright’s termination provisions is not unique. Other bodies of law
have long discriminated against same-sex couples, and copyright law has in
the past contained reversion provisions that treated authors and their
spouses unequally based on gender.
IV.

AVENUES TO FULL EQUALITY

Copyright’s termination provisions now treat an author and her samesex spouse almost equally with an author and her different-sex spouse. But
most, but not all works. Id. (providing alternative renewal provisions for posthumous works, works
made for hire, and periodical, cyclopaedic, or other composite works).
81 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (Brennan, J.).
82 Id. at 685.
83 Id.
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as explained in Part II.D., full equality has not yet been achieved. The
remaining inequality might seem highly technical—whether the identity of
a married author’s widow or widower is determined by the law of the state
where the author is domiciled at death or the law of the state where the
author entered into the marriage. But this technical issue has a significant
impact on authors. As of April 30, 2015, 13 states84 do not allow same-sex
couples to marry and do not recognize as married for all purposes same-sex
couples who get married in a state that does allow them to do so. As a
result, gay and lesbian authors who live in any of those 13 states simply
have no way (short of relocating to another state) to ensure that copyright
law will treat their same-sex spouses as their widows or widowers, entitled
to exercise the statutory termination right. These authors cannot marry their
partners in their home states. Even if they travel to another state and marry
there, the authors’ home states will not recognize the marriages, and
copyright law will incorporate that denial of recognition. Millions of people
currently live in these nonrecognition states,85 and those who are authors
with a same-sex partner are treated unequally by federal copyright law.
This Part considers the avenues available for ending this unequal
treatment. First, Part IV.A examines pending Supreme Court cases, due for
decision by this summer, that challenge the constitutionality of state laws
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and barring recognition of
same-sex couples’ marriages entered into in other states. It considers the
possible ways the Court could decide those issues, and what effect each
decision would have on copyright law’s remaining inequality. Part IV.B.
explores how this inequality could be eliminated if the Court’s decision
does not do so, looking at the possibility of change at both the state and
federal levels. Finally, Part IV.C. explains the international dimension of
copyright law’s unequal treatment of authors and their same-sex spouses,
and shows that even a total victory for marriage equality advocates in the

84

State bans on marrying same-sex couples in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee have
been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 574
U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1039 (2015) (Order List, Jan. 16, 2015). State bans in North Dakota and Georgia
have not been ruled on, though court challenges are pending. In Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Texas, court rulings striking down state bans have been
stayed pending appeal. See http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2015)
85 Figures from the 2014 U.S. Census show that 71.4% of the population of the United States
lives in states where same-sex couples can marry. Human Rights Campaign, Percent of Population
Living
in
States
with
Marriage
Equality
(Apr.
15,
2015),
at
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/percent-of-population-living-in-states-with-marriage-equality.
This figure includes the population of Alabama where, as noted in the text accompanying note 92,
infra, the status of marriage equality is currently unclear. That leaves nearly one-third of the U.S.
population living in states where same-sex couples cannot marry.
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Supreme Court would not itself result in equal treatment of authors living
abroad.
A. The Pending Supreme Court Challenge & Possible Outcomes
How long copyright law’s unequal treatment of same-sex couples will
last depends in large part on the outcome of four consolidated cases86
currently pending before the Supreme Court and collectively referred to as
Obergefell v. Hodges. These cases are before the Court on a writ of
certiorari in a consolidated Sixth Circuit decision upholding state laws (in
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) that bar same-sex couples from
marrying.87 The Court granted certiorari on two questions:
1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment
require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?88

The Court heard arguments in the case on April 28, 2015, and how the
Court rules on each of these questions will largely determine whether the
remaining inequality in copyright’s termination provisions persists. Those
answers could eliminate, reduce, or perpetuate copyright law’s unequal
treatment of authors with same-sex partners, as the following sections
explain.
1. Eliminating Copyright’s Unequal Treatment
If the Court rules that states must allow same-sex couples to marry and
must recognize such couples’ out-of-state marriages, then copyright’s
termination provisions will at last treat gay and lesbian authors with samesex partners who live anywhere in the United States just as well as it treats
authors with different-sex partners. An author will be able to marry a samesex partner in every state in the union. And an author married anywhere in
the U.S. will be able to move to any other state and have her same-sex
spouse recognized as her survivor when she dies. If the Court requires states
to treat gay men and lesbians and their same-sex partners equally for
marriage purposes, then copyright law’s incorporation by reference of state
marriage law will incorporate uniform equal treatment throughout the
United States.89 Every state would recognize a deceased author’s surviving
86

Obergefell v. Hodges (U.S.) (No. 14-556); Tanco v. Haslam (U.S.) (No. 14-562); DeBoer v.
Snyder (U.S.) (No. 14-571); Bourke v. Beshear (U.S.) (No. 14-556).
87 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
88 574 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1039 (2015) (Order List, Jan. 16, 2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14571, 14-574).
89 As discussed in Part IV.C., infra, an international dimension of inequality would remain even
if the Obergefell decision results in a uniform domestic rule of marriage equality.
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same-sex spouse as a spouse, so the survivor would qualify as a widow or
widower and be entitled under the Copyright Act to all or at least half of the
dead author’s termination interest.90
2. Reducing Copyright’s Unequal Treatment
A split decision on the two questions presented in the Obergefell cases
would reduce copyright’s unequal treatment, but not eliminate it.
a. If the Constitution Only Requires Recognition
The Court could rule that states may refuse to marry same-sex couples
but must recognize those couples’ marriages when entered into in another
state. Gay and lesbian authors would then face more obstacles to having
their same-sex partners treated as their spouses under copyright law than
authors with different-sex partners face, but they could secure such
treatment. Under such a decision, authors in many states would still be
unable to marry their same-sex partners, but the couple could travel to any
state that does allow same-sex couples to marry, get married, return home,
and have their marriage recognized by their home state (and therefore by the
Copyright Act). This would give an author and her same sex spouse living
anywhere in the United States a path to equal treatment under copyright
law.
But this treatment would still impose a hardship on gay and lesbian
authors. They would have to find the time and money to travel to a state
where they can marry their same-sex partner. This burden may not be
inconsequential. If the Court decides that the Constitution allows states to
deny marriage to same-sex couples, then these authors may have to travel
quite far in order to legally marry a same-sex partner. As of April 30, 2015,
in 20 states same-sex couples may marry only because federal courts struck
down those state’s marriage bans as violative of the federal constitution,91

90

See text accompanying note 40, supra.
Alaska (Hamby v. Parnell, 2014 WL 5089399 (D. Alaska 2014); Arizona (Connolly v. Jeanes,
2014 WL 5320642 (D. Ariz. 2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014));
California (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, Perry v. Hollingsworth, 725 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2013); Colorado (Burns v.
Hickenlooper, 2014 WL 5312541 (D. Colo. 2014); Brinkman v. Long, 2014 WL 3408024 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 2014); Florida (Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014)); Idaho (Latta v.
Otter, 19 F.Supp.3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014)); Indiana (Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), aff’g 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (S.D. Indiana)); Kansas (Marie v.
Moser, 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. 2014), appeal docketed No. 14-3246 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014));
Montana (Rolando v. Fox, 23 F.Supp.3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014)); Nevada (Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’g Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F.Supp.2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012)); North Carolina
(General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Cooper, 12 F.Supp.3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014));
Oklahoma (Bishop v. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) aff’d sub nom Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014)); Oregon (Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.2d 1128 (D. Ore.
91
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and in 8 additional states, federal or state court decisions striking down state
marriage bans on federal constitutional grounds are currently on appeal (or,
in the case of Alabama, under challenge from the state’s supreme court).92
Bans in four other states (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) were
upheld by the Sixth Circuit in the cases under review by the Supreme Court,
and bans in North Dakota and Georgia have so far not been struck down in
court challenges. A decision by the Obergefell Court that states can
constitutionally ban same-sex couples from marrying would presumably
render the state bans in most of those 34 states enforceable. (The effect of
such a decision on marriage law in California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania is
unclear, since the federal district court decisions invalidating those states’
bans were not appealed by the states.93) That would leave only 16 states

2014)); Pennsylvania (Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Penn. 2014)); South Carolina
(Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014)); Utah (Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th
Cir. 2014), aff’g 961 F.Supp.2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013)); Virginia (Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2014), aff’g Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014)); West Virginia (McGee
v. Cole, 2014 WL 5802665 (S.D.W.V. 2014)); Wisconsin (Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.
2014), aff’g Wolf v. Walker, 986 F.Supp.2d 982 (W.D. Wisc. 2014)); Wyoming (Guzzo v. Mead,
2014 WL 5317797 (D. Wyo. 2014)).
92 Alabama (Searcy v. Strange, 2015 WL 328728 (S.D. Ala. 2015); Strawser v. Strange, 2015
WL 1186326 (S.D. Ala. 2015), countermanded by Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst.,
2015 WL 892752 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) (ordering state probate judges to discontinue issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples)); Arkansas (Jernigan v. Crane, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2014 WL 6685391
(E.D. Ark. 2014), appeal docketed (8th Cir. argument scheduled May 12, 2015); Texas (De Leon v.
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014), appeal docketed sub nom. DeLeon v. Abbott, No. 1450196 (5th Cir. argued Jan. 9, 2015)); Louisiana (In re Constanza and Brewer, No. 2013-0052 D2,
15th Judicial District Court, appeal docketed sub. nom Costanza v. Caldwell, No. 2014-CA-2090 (La.
argued Jan. 29, 2015));Missouri (Lawson v, Kelly, 2014 WL 5810215 (W.D. Mo. 2014), appeal
docketed No. 14-3779 (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2014)); Mississippi (Campaign for Southern Equality v.
Bryant, 2014 WL 6680570 (S.D. Mississippi 2014), appeal docketed No. 14-60837 (5th Cir. argued
Jan. 9, 2015)); South Dakota (Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 2015 WL 144567 (D.S.D. 2015), appeal
docketed No. 15-1186 (8th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015)); Nebraska (Waters v. Ricketts, 2015 WL 852603 (D.
Neb. 2015), appeal docketed No. 15-1452 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015)). In Louisiana, a federal district
court opinion upheld the state ban on marrying same-sex couples, Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2
F.Supp.3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014), and that decision is on appeal, No. 14-31037 (5th Cir. argued Jan. 9,
2015). In Arkansas, a separate challenge is pending in state court as well. Wright v. Arkansas (Ark.
6th Cir. 2014), appeal docketed (Arkansas argued Nov. 20, 2014).
93 In California, the decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
was not appealed by the state, and the Supreme Court ruled that the intervenors in the litigation at the
trial court did not have standing to appeal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2652
(2013). As a result, it is not clear that a decision by the Supreme Court in Obergefell contrary to the
trial court’s determination in Perry on the merits of the federal constitutional claim would lead to any
immediate change in the status of marriage equality in California. State officials in Oregon did not
appeal the decision in Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.2d 1128 (D. Ore. 2014), and the Ninth
Circuit found that a third party did not have standing to intervene and appeal the decision. 2014 WL
8628611 (9th Cir. 2014). Events in Pennsylvania followed a similar pattern. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992
F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Penn. 2014), denial of intervention aff’d, No. 14-3048 (3d Cir. Jul. 3, 2014),
though apparently an appeal from the district court’s denial of another party’s motion to intervene in
the proceedings is still pending in the Third Circuit.
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(and the District of Columbia), principally in the Northeast, the upper
Midwest, and the West Coast, where couples will clearly still be able to
marry, because state law (whether legislation,94 referendum,95 or court
decision interpreting a state constitution96) authorizes such marriages. So
authors in some regions of the nation may need to travel very far from home
in order to legally marry their same-sex partners, particularly if they live in
the South, the mountain West, or Alaska.97
b. If the Constitution Requires States to Marry But Not Recognize
Similarly, a ruling by the Court that states must allow same-sex couples
to marry but need not recognize those couples’ marriages when entered into
in another state would continue to impose an extra burden on gay and
lesbian authors with same-sex partners but would not deny them equal
treatment outright. Consider Alison and Sam, who marry in Massachusetts
and later move to Georgia. Georgia would recognize the couple as married
under Georgia law if Alison is married to Samuel, but not if Alison is
married to Samantha. Alison and Samantha, though married under
Massachusetts law, would presumably have to marry again in Georgia in

94 Connecticut (2009 Conn. Acts 78 (Reg. Sess.), codified as amended in scattered sections of
Conn. Gen. Stat.); Delaware (79 Del. Laws Ch. 19 (2013), codified as amended in scattered sections
of Del. Code Ann. tit. 13); Hawaii (2014 Haw. Sess. Laws 1 (2013 2nd Spec. Sess.), codified as
amended in scattered sections of Haw. Rev. Stat.); Illinois (2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 4128 (West),
codified as amended in scattered sections of 750 Ill. Comp. Stat.); Maryland (2013 Md. Laws 9,
approved by Referendum Question No. 6, Nov. 6, 2012, and codified as amended in scattered
sections of Md. Code Ann.); Minnesota (2013 Minn. Laws 404, codified as amended in scattered
sections of Minn. Stat.); New Hampshire (2009 N.H. Laws 60, codified as amended in scattered
sections of NH Rev. Stat. Ann.); New York (2011 N.Y. Laws 751, codified as amended in scattered
sections of N.Y. Consol. Law.); Rhode Island (2013 R.I. Pub Laws 7, codified as amended in R.I.
Gen. Laws); Vermont (2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33, codified as amended in Vt. Stat. Ann.);
Washington (2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199, codified as amended in Wash. Rev. Code, approved by
Referendum Measure 74, Nov. 6, 2012); District of Columbia (57 D.C. Reg. 27 (Dec. 18, 2009),
codified as amended in scattered sections of D.C. Code). In Connecticut, the statutory change was
preceded by a court decision ruling on state grounds that same-sex couples could marry. Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
95 Maine (2013 Me. Laws 1125, initiated bill approved by voters Nov. 6, 2012 as Question 1,
codified as amended in Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19). In Maine, a direct initiative petition is verified by
Maine Secretary of State, then submitted to the Maine Legislature. In this case, the Legislature did
not enact it; instead, the Legislature referred the measure to the people for vote.
96 Iowa (Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)); Massachusetts (Goodridge v. Dept. of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)); New Jersey (Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d
1036 (N.J. 2013); New Mexico (Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013)). In addition to these
states, a state court ruling has allowed same-sex couples to marry in the city of St. Louis, but does not
apply statewide. Missouri v. Florida, 2014 WL 5654040 (Mo. 22d Jud. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014.
97
Such an outcome would likely be especially difficult on authors living in American Samoa,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which all appear to
bar same-sex couples from marrying, since an author in one of those jurisdictions would have to
travel quite far in order to reach a jurisdiction where she could marry her same-sex partner.
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order to be recognized as married under Georgia law (and therefore under
federal copyright law). Again, this would place a burden on gay and lesbian
authors with same-sex spouses that authors with different-sex partners do
not face. If those authors move to a nonrecognition state, they would have
to expend the time and money to get married in their new state of domicile
in order for their same-sex spouses to be recognized.
3. Continuing Copyright’s Unequal Treatment
Finally, if the Court decides both questions presented in Obergefell in
the negative, then copyright law’s unequal treatment of gay and lesbian
authors will not only continue, but will have more widespread effect than it
currently does. As noted above, if the Court affirms the Sixth Circuit’s
decision that the federal constitution permits states to ban same-sex couples
from marrying, then states that currently permit such couples to marry only
because of a federal court order based on a constitutional interpretation
contrary to the Supreme Court’s would again be able to ban such
marriages.98 Only gay and lesbian authors who live in the 16 states that
allow same-sex couples to marry as a matter of state law, in the District of
Columbia, in any states that recognize out-of-state marriages of same-sex
couples as a matter of state law, and possibly in California, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania would be able to have their same-sex partner recognized as
their spouse for purposes of copyright law.
B. Eliminating Copyright’s Inequality if Obergefell Doesn’t Do So
If the Court in Obergefell rules against the petitioners’ federal
constitutional claims to equal treatment and answers both of the questions
presented in the negative, that decision will leave copyright law’s unequal
treatment of gay and lesbian authors intact. Because copyright law’s
unequal treatment of gay and lesbian authors results when federal copyright
law incorporates unequal state marriage law, the continuing inequality
could be remedied in one of two ways. Either state marriage law could
change and treat same-sex couples equally, or federal copyright law could
change and incorporate state law that treats those couples equally. This
Section discusses both possibilities.
1. Changing State Marriage Law
If the Obergefell Court decides that the U.S. Constitution does not
compel states either to allow or to recognize marriages between same-sex
couples, then eliminating unequal treatment under copyright law by
changing state marriage laws will require changing each state’s law

98

See text accompanying notes 91–92.
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individually. If each state that bans same-sex couples from marrying
changed its individual marriage law, then same-sex couples would enjoy
uniform national equal treatment under copyright law. If every state in the
nation acted to allow same-sex couples to marry, or at least to recognize
marriages of same-sex couples performed in other states,99 then any author
who married a same-sex partner in a state where the marriage was legal
would know that, if she predeceased her spouse, her spouse would qualify
as her “widow” for termination of transfer purposes under federal copyright
law regardless of the state where the author was domiciled when she died.
This result could be reached in a variety of ways, likely varying from
state to state. Some states might decide to allow or recognize marriages of
same-sex couples by legislative action,100 while others might do so by a
state court decision.101 In many states, the change would likely be more
arduous than simple legislative enactment or judicial interpretation, since
many of the states that bar same-sex couples from marrying have done so
by amending their state constitutions. Ending the ban in those states will
likely require a subsequent constitutional amendment.102 The ultimate result
would be equal treatment under copyright law for authors with same-sex
spouses and authors with different-sex spouses, but this route to equality
seems likely to take quite a long time, given the political hurdles involved
in many of the states that currently do not recognize marriages between two
people of the same sex.
2. Changing Federal Recognition Principles
The federal route to equal treatment under copyright law would be more
straightforward, requiring only a single change in federal copyright law.
Even in the face of unequal state marriage laws, copyright law could be
reformed to treat authors’ same-sex and different-sex spouses almost fully
equally simply by changing the marriage recognition rule in copyright’s

99

If some states recognized out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples, but did not allow those
couples to marry in state, then copyright law would still incorporate by reference the inequality that
would require a couple living in a state that does not allow same-sex couples to marry to travel to
another state in order to obtain the benefits of a marriage recognized under copyright law. See the
discussion in Section IV.A.2.a, text accompanying notes 91–96, supra.
100 See note 94, supra.
101 See note 96, supra.
102 Thirty states have adopted constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex couples from
marrying. See Brief for Respondents at 1a–7a, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2015)
(identifying 35 state referenda regarding same-sex marriage resulting in constitutional bans in all but
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington; Hawai’i adopted a constitutional amendment
allowing
the
legislature
to
define
marriage
to
exclude
same-sex
couples)
(http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV5/14571_resp.authcheckdam.pdf).
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statutory definition of “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower.’ ” Congress could easily
amend federal law to make this change, either by amending the Copyright
Act or by addressing federal marriage recognition more globally.103
Bills to change the Copyright Act in this way, the Copyright and
Marriage Equality Act, are currently pending in both the House and the
Senate.104 These bills would adopt a state-of-celebration rule for marriage
recognition by amending the Copyright Act’s definition of “ ‘widow’ or
‘widower’ ” to read:
An individual is the “widow” or “widower” of an author if the
courts of the State in which the individual and the author were
married (or, if the individual and the author were not married in any
State but were validly married in another jurisdiction, the courts of
any State) would find that the individual and the author were validly
married at the time of the author’s death, whether or not the spouse
has later remarried.105
Under this revised language, as long as an author and her same-sex spouse
were validly married under the law of the state where they entered into the
marriage (and did not divorce before the author’s death), federal copyright
law would treat the author’s surviving spouse as the author’s widow or
widower, and the surviving spouse would own at least half of the author’s
termination interest, even if the author died domiciled in a marriage
inequality state.

103

Congress has the authority to define in its statutes which state law the statute will look to in
order to determine issues to be resolved by reference to state law. Baude, supra note 57, at 1401.
104 H.R. 238, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced Jan. 9, 2015, by Rep. Derek Kilmer); S. 23, 114th
Cong. (2015) (introduced Jan. 6, 2015, by Sen. Patrick Leahy). The amending language in these bills
is identical to the corresponding language in the Copyright and Marriage Equality Act, H.R. 5617,
113th Cong. (2014) (introduced in September 2014 by Rep. Derek Kilmer) and S. 2919, 113th Cong.
(2014) (introduced in November 2014 by Sen. Patrick Leahy). Neither of those bills was acted on in
the 113th Congress.
105 § 2(a), H.R. 238, 114th Cong. (2015); § 2(a), S. 23, 114th Cong. (2015). See also Brad A.
Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghosts and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 102, 108 (2014) (suggesting recognizing surviving spouse for termination purposes based
on the law of the state of celebration of the author’s marriage). The language in these bills covering
couples “not married in any State” would appear to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex
couples in foreign countries that allow such couples to marry, regardless of where the author is
domiciled at death.
Other bills have been introduced to eliminate other specific federal law provisions that recognize
only marriages that are valid under the laws of a person’s place of residence, rather than also
recognizing those that are valid under the law of place of the marriage’s celebration. These bills
include the Social Security and Marriage Equality Act, S. 2305, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 4664,
113th Cong. (2014) and the Charlie Morgan Military Spouses Equal Treatment Act, S. 373, 113th
Cong. (2013).
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Another legislative approach would be for Congress to adopt a global
state-of-celebration rule that would recognize under all federal laws,
including the Copyright Act, any marriage validly entered into. The Respect
for Marriage Act,106 introduced in both houses of Congress in early 2015,
would take this approach and amend federal law to recognize each member
of a same-sex couple as married to the other for any federal law purpose as
long the marriage “is valid in the State where the marriage was entered
into.”107 Because the act would apply “[f]or the purposes of any Federal law
in which marital status is a factor,”108 if adopted it would appear to override
the choice-of-law provision in copyright law’s current definition of
“ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” that would only recognize marriages as valid
based on the law of the author’s domicile at death.
As explained above,109 these approaches would preserve one practical
inequality—a same-sex couple living in a state that does not allow them to
marry would need to expend the resources to travel to a state that will
permit them to marry in order for the author’s spouse to be treated as her
spouse by federal copyright law, while a different-sex couple could simply
marry in their own state. Nevertheless, this revision of the copyright statute
would likely allow almost any author who wishes to do so to ensure that her
same-sex spouse will be able to exercise the termination interest after the
author’s death.
The likelihood that Congress will enact either legislative proposal for
changing copyright’s marriage recognition rule in the near future seems
relatively low. Extending termination rights to validly married same-sex
couples regardless of their state of residence might also occur by litigation,
rather than by legislation. A same-sex spouse of a deceased author who died
domiciled in a state that did not recognize the couple’s marriage could argue
that it violates the federal constitution for federal copyright law to
determine whether a person is married for purposes of eligibility for federal
benefits such as the right to terminate a copyright assignment by reference
to discriminatory state law. Such a challenge could be based on a claim that
copyright law’s definition of “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” impermissibly
106 S. 29, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced Jan. 6, 2015 by Sen. Dianne Feinstein); H.R. 197,
114th Cong. (2015) (introduced Feb. 2, 2015 by Rep. Jerrold Nadler). The relevant provisions of
these bills are identical to those of the Respect for Marriage Act, S. 1236, 113th Cong., which was
not acted on in the 113th Congress.
107 Id. at § 3. The bill would also recognize the marriage, if it was entered into outside any state,
“if the marriage is valid in the place where entered into and the marriage could have been entered into
in a State.” Id. This would appear to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in those
foreign countries that allow such couples to marry.
108 Id. at § 3 (emphasis added).
109 See Part IV.A.2.a., text accompanying notes 91–96, supra.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608130

34

R. Anthony Reese

[18-May-15

discriminates against an author’s same-sex spouse through a classification
based on gender or sexual orientation.110 If two otherwise identically
situated couples—Alison and Samuel, and Alison and Samantha—marry in
Massachusetts and then move to Georgia before Alison dies, then copyright
law will treat Samuel as Alison’s widower, but will not treat Samantha as
Alison’s widow because of Samantha’s gender (she is female, while Samuel
is male) and her sexual orientation (Alison and Samantha are lesbians,
while Alison and Samuel are heterosexual).
Laws that discriminate based on gender are generally subject to
intermediate scrutiny when challenged as violations of equal protection;
laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation might also be subject to
intermediate scrutiny.111 But while copyright law’s marriage recognition
rule has a discriminatory impact based on the gender and sexual orientation
of an author’s spouse, the definition itself is facially neutral: the law does
not look directly to the gender or sexual orientation of the author’s
surviving spouse, it simply directs which state law to look to in deciding
who is the author’s surviving spouse.112 A law that is facially neutral is
considered to classify people based on gender (and is therefore subject to
110 For an extended exposition of the argument that laws barring marriage between same-sex
couples constitute discrimination based on gender, see Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving:
Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1089–96 (2014).
The copyright law definition might instead be viewed as treating authors and their spouses
differently based on the author’s state of residence. If two identically situated authors validly marry
spouses of the same sex in Massachusetts, and one author remains in Massachusetts while the other
moves to Georgia, then when the authors both die, copyright law will recognize the same-sex spouse
of the author who dies in Massachusetts as that author’s surviving spouse, but will not recognize the
same-sex spouse of the author who dies in Georgia as that author’s surviving spouse, based solely on
the state in which the author lived at the time of death. Laws that treat people differently based on the
state in which they live are not based on a suspect classification (such as race, gender, or possibly
sexual orientation), and thus are subject only to rational basis review when challenged as violations
of equal protection. Because I conclude, infra, that even equal protection challenges to the copyright
definition based on gender or sexual orientation claims would likely be subject only to rational basis
review, the outcome of any such challenge would not appear to depend on how the court views the
challenged classification.
111 The Supreme Court did not expressly indicate in Windsor the level of scrutiny it was using to
determine whether the laws at issue violated the equal protection guarantee. The Ninth Circuit has
concluded that laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation use a suspect classification and are
constitutional only if they survive heightened scrutiny. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471, 479–84 (9th Cir. 2014).
112 By contrast, state marriage laws which refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages of same-sex
couples are not facially neutral, but rather on their face make citizens’ rights depend on their gender.
See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened
Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1089–96 and 1110 (2014). A challenge to the Copyright Act’s
definition might argue that the definition, properly read, is not facially neutral because it must be read
to include the facially gender-based state law that it expressly incorporates. If a court accepted that
reading of the statute, it should apply intermediate scrutiny to the gender-based state marriage
recognition law.
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intermediate scrutiny) only if the law has a discriminatory purpose as well
as a discriminatory effect.113
It is unlikely that anyone challenging copyright law’s definition of
“ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” could prove that the definition has a
discriminatory purpose. The Court has explained that a discriminatory
purpose “implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ and not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”114 There is no
legislative history indicating that the Copyright Act’s definition was drafted
in any part because it would treat authors with different-sex spouses
differently than authors with same-sex spouses. During the twenty-year
revision process that eventually resulted in the adoption of the 1976
Copyright Act, the definition first appeared in the 1965 Revision Bill
drafted by the Register of Copyrights.115 That was the first revision bill that
granted a deceased author’s termination right expressly to an author’s
surviving spouse,116 and the drafters simultaneously included in the bill a
definition of “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ”—a definition identical to the
definition in the 1976 Act as adopted, except for changes to make the
pronouns gender neutral.117 The text of the Register’s report accompanying
the draft bill merely restates the definition and does not offer any rationale
for choosing the law of the author’s domicile at the time of death, and
certainly gives no indication that the choice was in any part motivated

113

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations
omitted).
115 H.R. 4347, S. 1006, 89th Cong. (1965).
116 The first revision bills introduced in Congress during the revision process, H.R. 11947 and S.
3008, 88th Cong. (1964), contained an embryonic version of the termination provisions ultimately
included in the 1976 Act, but that version allowed termination by the author’s “legal representatives,
legatees, or heirs” if the author was dead when the time for termination arrived, and did not expressly
reference the author’s widow or widower. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 225 (Comm. Print 1965).
117 Compare H.R. 4347, § 101 (“The author’s “widow” or “widower” is the author’s surviving
spouse under the law of his domicile at the time of his death, whether or not the spouse has later
remarried.”) and 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“widow” or “widower”) (“The author’s “widow” or “widower” is
the author’s surviving spouse under the law of the author’s domicile at the time of his or her death,
whether or not the spouse has later remarried.”). The fact that the only changes to the definition
during the legislative process made the definition expressly applicable to both male and female
authors could also undercut the argument that the definition was adopted with the purpose of creating
a discriminatory gender classification.
114
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because there could be a discriminatory effect on authors’ surviving samesex spouses.118
The definition was likely included in part in response to the questions
that had arisen under the renewal provisions of the 1909 Act. The Supreme
Court had ruled in 1956 that the identity of an author’s widow, widower, or
child, entitled by the Copyright Act to renew the author’s copyright, should
be determined by looking to state law.119 But the Court in that case avoided
any definitive decision on which state law to look to.120 The Copyright
Office in 1960 noted that the Court’s decision left open the problem of
“deciding conflicts of law questions.”121 The principal committee report on
the bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act simply notes that “[t]he terms
‘widow,’ ‘widower,’ and ‘children’ are defined in section 101 in an effort to
avoid problems and uncertainties that have arisen under the present renewal
section.”122
Of course, during the entire period from the introduction of the
definition in 1965 to its adoption in 1976, no author had any same-sex
spouse, and no author had any reasonably foreseeable prospect of having a
same-sex spouse. During that period, all states barred same-sex couples
from marrying, the Supreme Court had dismissed a case seeking to expand
marriage to same-sex couples for want of a substantial federal question,123
and no state was considering the possibility of allowing those couples to
marry. Given the actual historical context in which same-sex marriage was
for the most part not even imagined by most legislators as a serious
possibility, it seems difficult to think that a choice-of-law rule in a
definitional section of a copyright bill was seen as a way to disadvantage
gay and lesbian authors and their same-sex partners.124 More likely, the
118 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 74 (Comm. Print 1965).
119 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1956).
120 The Court noted that “it appears from the record that the only State concerned is California,
and both parties have argued the case on that assumption.” Id. at 581.
121 Barbara Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (STUDY NO. 31) 180 in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 29–31
(Comm. Print 1961).
122 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 125 (1976).
123 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appeal of 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
124 Doug NeJaime has made clear, however, that the issue of marriage for gay and lesbian
couples was not completely unknown, in both legal and activist circles, at least by the early 1970s.
Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 94–97 (2014). And he notes that California in 1977
revised its statutes to make clear that marriage was available only “between a man and a woman” in
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Copyright Act’s definition simply adopted the usual choice-of-law rule for
issues of intestate succession, looking to the decedent’s state of domicile to
determine the disposition of the decedent’s personal property.125
If a court were not persuaded that the facially neutral definition of
“ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” in the copyright statute was enacted at least in
part to discriminate based on the gender or sexual orientation of the author’s
spouse, then any claim that the definition violates equal protection would be
evaluated not under intermediate scrutiny, but only under rational basis
review. That means that the definition is constitutional so long as it is
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”126 Thus, the constitutional
question would turn on whether choosing the law of the state where an
author is domiciled at death, rather than the law of the state where the
author’s marriage was entered into, to determine the identity of the author’s
surviving spouse for purposes of copyright termination is rationally related
to any legitimate interest of federal copyright law.
Two pending cases are currently testing the constitutionality of such
federal marriage recognition rules in the context of other federal statutes.
American Military Partner Association v. McDonald,127 a petition for
review pending in the Federal Circuit, seeks review of a decision by the
Department of Veterans Affairs interpreting the statutory provisions
governing veterans’ benefits128 as allowing the VA to recognize a same-sex
couple’s marriage as valid only according to the couple’s place of
residence.129 Similarly, Murphy v. Colvin130 challenges the Social Security

response to efforts by same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses based on non-specific statutory
language. Id. at 97.
125 RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 628 (6th ed. 2010) (“In the
United States, the almost universally accepted choice-of-law rule for intestate distribution of
personalty selects the domicile at death of the decedent.”). Of course, under ordinary choice-of-law
principles in intestacy cases, a court in the decedent’s state of domicile might nonetheless look to the
law of another state (e.g., the state in which the decedent got married) to determine the identity of the
decedent’s widow or children, and then look to its own law to determine how the decedent’s property
should be distributed to those identified parties. Id. at 628 n. 242.
126 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
127 No. 2014-____ (filed Aug. 18. 2014), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legaldocs/ampa_us_20140819_ampa-petition-for-review. The petitioner is represented by, among others,
the law firm of Morrison & Foerster LLP. While the author of this article is Special Counsel to
Morrison & Foerster, he is not involved in any way in the referenced litigation.
128 These include benefits (“such as disability compensation, death pension benefits, home loan
guarantees, and rights to burial together in national cemeteries.” Petition for Review at 8.
129
Note, either at the time the marriage was entered into (so the marriage is not valid if the
couple traveled from their home state that does not allow same-sex couples to marry to get married in
a state that does allow such marriages) or at the time when the right to the benefit in question
accrued.
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Administration’s denial of spousal benefits to a Texas woman whose wife
died domiciled in Texas, which does not recognize their marriage in 2010 in
Massachusetts.
The petitioner in McDonald argues that “[t]he VA’s incorporation of
state definitions of marital status that discriminate against same-sex couples
to determine eligibility for federal spousal benefits . . . violates the Fifth
Amendment, including by impinging on the fundamental right to marry and
by denying equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation and sex.”131
The plaintiffs in Murphy also argue that the Social Security
Administration’s application of its statute unconstitutionally discriminates
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, and unconstitutionally
burdens the fundamental rights to marry and to travel.
If the Supreme Court rejects the petitioners’ constitutional claims in
Obergefell, then the grounds for the Court’s rejections, and any subsequent
decisions in the AMPA and Murphy cases, should provide guidance on the
likelihood that litigation challenging copyright law’s marriage recognition
rule could succeed. If the arguments in these pending cases do not succeed,
then legislation altering copyright’s marriage recognition rule would remain
as the principal federal avenue to end copyright law’s unequal treatment of
authors’ same-sex spouses.
C. The International Dimension of Inequality
As explained in Section IV.A, if the Obergefell Court rules in favor of
same-sex couples on both questions presented in that case, then copyright
law will incorporate by reference uniform equal state marriage law
throughout the United States. But even that outcome will not give authors
with same-sex spouses complete equality under copyright law. Instead, the
Copyright Act’s marriage recognition rule would still treat authors with
same-sex spouses unequally, at least where those authors live and die
outside the United States.
The Copyright Act defines an author’s “ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ” as the
author’s surviving spouse “under the law of the author’s domicile” when the
author dies. Most American authors, of course, will be domiciled at death
somewhere in the territory of the United States. So if the Court in
Obergefell decides that the federal constitution compels every state to allow
same-sex couples to marry or to recognize their out-of-state marriages, that
decision would apply in all of the places where most American authors are
130

No. ____ (D.D.C. filed Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/incourt/legal-docs/murphy_20141022_complaint.
131 Petition for Review at 10–11.
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domiciled. The statute, though, is not limited to domicile within the United
States,132 and many authors will be domiciled outside the United States
when they die.
In some instances, American authors will have moved to a foreign
country, established a domicile in that country, and then died there. Famous
American authors who lived overseas when they died include James
Baldwin, Paul Bowles, Gertrude Stein, and Edith Wharton. In many more
instances, non-American authors will die domiciled outside the United
States. These authors’ works will generally be protected by U.S. copyright,
because the Copyright Act grants copyright protection to works by authors
who are nationals of most countries in the world.133 And these nonAmerican authors’ transfers of their U.S. copyright rights will be subject to
termination under section 203,134 even if the author has never set foot in the
United States.
A favorable decision in Obergefell would make marriage between samesex couples uniformly available and recognized only within the United
States. Many jurisdictions outside the United States do not recognize samesex couples as married or allow them to marry.135 Of course, many people
132

Indeed, section 104 of the Copyright Act uses the term “domicile” and the related forms
“domiciliary” and “domiciled” in contexts that expressly included domicile outside the United States.
17 U.S.C. § 104(a), (b)(1), (b)(6). There is no indication that Congress intended the term to have a
different meaning in § 101 than in § 104.
133 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) grants copyright in the United States to unpublished works “without
regard to the nationality or domicile of the author,” while § 104(b) grants copyright in the United
States to published works if “one or more of the authors [of the work] . . . is a national, domiciliary,
or sovereign authority” of a country that is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, or the World Trade Organization
Agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“treaty party” and “international agreement”). Nearly every country in
the world is party to one of those agreements. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 3–9 (2014), available at
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf (listing only Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, San
Marino, and Turkmenistan as countries with which the United States has no copyright relations, and
only Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tuvalu
as countries for which the status of copyright relations is unclear).
134 Section 203 expressly provides that if an author’s grant of copyright rights is terminated
under its provisions, that termination “affects only those rights covered by the grant[] that arise
under” title 17 of the U.S. Code, “and in no way affects rights arising under any other Federal, State,
or foreign laws.” 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5). But while the statute expressly limits the effect of
termination to domestic U.S. rights, it does not limit the availability of termination to U.S. authors.
Instead, foreign authors who are granted copyright protection in the United States by the U.S.
Copyright Act can terminate transfers of their U.S. copyright rights under section 203. Of course,
since termination only happens if the author (or her successors) knows of and follows the
complicated statutory procedure, many foreign authors may be unlikely to exercise their termination
rights.
135 See Brief For Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Harold Hongju Koh, Thomas
Buergenthal, Sarah H. Cleveland, Laurence R. Helfer, Ryan Goodman, and Sujit Choudhry as Amici
Curiae In Support Of Petitioners at 14, Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574
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living in those jurisdictions may nonetheless have legally married a samesex partner somewhere else, even though the place of their current domicile
does not recognize the marriage. If an author dies while domiciled in one of
these foreign jurisdictions, then the Copyright Act’s current marriage
recognition rule would not recognize the author’s same-sex spouse as the
author’s “widow” or “widower” for termination purposes. So, for example,
if an American author marries her same-sex spouse in the United States
before the couple relocates to Florence, Italy, and if the author dies while
domiciled in Italy (which does not recognize same-sex couples as married),
U.S. copyright law would not recognize the author’s surviving same-sex
spouse as the author’s widow for termination purposes. Similarly, an Italian
author and her same-sex partner ma travel outside Italy and get married, but
if the Italian author dies domiciled in Italy, her spouse will not be
recognized as her widow for termination purposes. By contrast, the
different-sex spouse of an author—American or Italian—who dies
domiciled in Italy will qualify as the author’s widow or widower who owns
some or all of the author’s termination interest.
This continuing unequal treatment of married gay and lesbian authors
living outside the United States originates in the laws of the countries where
the authors live. A decision in Obergefell granting uniform domestic equal
treatment to same-sex couples will therefore not eliminate this inequality
from copyright law. Until the marriages of same-sex couples are recognized
throughout the world, only a change in copyright’s marriage recognition
rule will end this inequality. As discussed in the previous section, such a
change could come either through legislation or litigation.
On the legislative front, the language of both the Copyright and
Marriage Equality Act and the Respect for Marriage Act, discussed in
Section IV.B.2, would address this international inequality. By recognizing
a same-sex couple’s marriage as valid if the marriage was valid in the state
where it was entered into,136 these bills would recognize as married a couple
who wed in any state in the United States and was then domiciled overseas.
And each bill would provide that if a marriage was not entered into in any
U.S. state, it would be recognized if it was valid where it was entered into
and it either would be recognized by any U.S. state,137 or could have been
(U.S. filed Mar. 6, 2015) (identifying only twenty countries (counting England, Scotland, and Wales
separately) that have adopted full marriage equality, and one that recognizes same-sex couples’
marriages
performed
elsewhere),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/AmicusBriefs/14556_Foreign_and_Comparative_Law_Experts.pdf.
136
Copyright & Marriage Equality Act, supra note ___, at § 2(a); Respect for Marriage Equality
Act, supra note ___, at § 3.
137 Copyright & Marriage Equality Act, supra note ___, at § 2(a).
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entered into in any U.S. State.138 On the litigation front, whether surviving
spouses of authors who died while domiciled abroad could successfully
challenge their denial of recognition as “widows” and “widowers” as
unconstitutional would likely depend in large part on how the Court
resolves the constitutional questions presented in Obergefell.
V.

PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR AUTHORS & THEIR SAME-SEX SPOUSES

While, as the last Part demonstrates, there are a number of ways to
reform copyright law to achieve full equal treatment of married same-sex
couples, most of those avenues will take time, at least if the Obergefell
Court does not decide that the Constitution requires all states to allow samesex couples to marry. Meanwhile, authors with same-sex spouses must
continue to operate under the current, inequitable law. To return to the
hypothetical from Part II, given that copyright’s termination provisions still
do not treat an author’s same-sex spouse equally with other authors’
different-sex spouses, even after Windsor struck down section 3 of DOMA,
what steps can Alison take to maximize the possibility that Samantha will
be able to enjoy any benefits that might flow from terminating Alison’s
transfer of copyright to BigPubCo? More generally, what advice should a
lawyer give to an author who has a same-sex partner and wants that partner
to benefit from copyright’s termination of transfer provisions? At least four
steps seem clear.
1. Get married. If Alison and Samantha haven’t yet married in a state
that allows them to, they should tie the knot. This will mean that, if Alison
dies before Samantha, Samantha can exercise the termination right if Alison
remains domiciled in Massachusetts, but also if Alison dies domiciled in
Atlanta and the law changes so that either (a) Georgia recognizes her
marriage to Samantha in Massachusetts or (b) federal copyright law
recognizes Samantha as Alison’s widow because they were validly married
in Massachusetts. Because the window in which a termination notice can be
served remains open for 13 years, it is certainly possible that the law could
change over that time. A notice could be served on BigPubCo to terminate
Alison’s grant as early as 2020 (ten years before the earliest possible
effective termination date in 2030) or as late as 2033 (two years before the
latest possible effective termination date in 2035). If Alison were to die in
2019, Samantha might not be recognized as Alison’s widow in 2020, but if

138

Respect for Marriage Equality Act, supra note ___, at § 3.
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the law were to change at some point before 2033, Samantha could then
terminate Alison’s grant as Alison’s widow.139
2. Don’t die. Authors obviously have little direct control over this, but
the longer Alison lives, the more likely it will be that she herself will be
able to terminate her transfer (and thereafter direct any financial benefits
from the termination to Samantha) or that the law will change in a way that
would allow Samantha to exercise the termination right if Samantha
outlives Alison (for example, if Alison dies domiciled in Atlanta and
Georgia law changes to recognize Alison and Samantha’s marriage in
Massachusetts, or if the federal Copyright and Marriage Equality Act is
adopted). 140
3. Make a will leaving the termination interest to your same-sex spouse.
As discussed above, if Alison has a valid will leaving her termination
interest to Samantha, Samantha will be able to exercise the termination
interest under section 203(a)(2)(D), even if Alison dies domiciled in

139 A termination notice can be served at any point during a 12-year period, 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(3)–(4), and the rights secured by the termination notice do not vest until the notice is served,
17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). As a result, who is entitled to terminate an author’s assignment can change
during the notice window. If the author is alive when the window opens then the author is entitled to
terminate, but if the author dies before doing so, then the author’s surviving spouse and/or children
would be entitled to terminate. Similarly, if the author dies before the termination window opens,
survived by a spouse and one child, the termination interest is owned by the spouse and the child. But
if they do not exercise the termination interest right away, and the spouse then dies, the entire
termination interest is owned by the child.
This fluidity regarding who is entitled to terminate at what time may present special difficulties
when combined with the copyright act’s shifting unequal treatment of author’s same-sex spouses.
Consider the case of Author, who assigned the copyright in a novel to Publisher in 1980, and who
then married his same-sex partner of many years, Spouse, in 2004 in their home state of
Massachusetts. Assume that Author died in 2005 in Massachusetts, survived by Spouse and by an
adult Daughter. In 2007, Daughter served a termination notice on Publisher terminating Author’s
1980 assignment effective on July 1, 2015. Spouse did not join in the termination since in 2007,
pursuant to DOMA, the Copyright Act did not at the time recognize Spouse as Author’s widow. After
the Windsor decision struck down section 3 of DOMA, may Publisher now challenge Daughter’s
termination as invalid, arguing that under Windsor, she owns only 50% of Author’s termination
interest, and so must join with Spouse to effectively terminate?
140 If Alison and Samantha are married and live in a state that does not recognize their marriage,
and one of them is in ill health, they may wish to sue seeking a court order that their state of
residence must recognize their marriage. A number of suits in the current wave of marriage equality
litigation have been brought seeking such recognition on behalf of couples where one member of the
couple faces serious health problems and seeks to establish marriage recognition before that spouse
dies. Baskin v. Bogan, First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 2014 WL
1873842 (S.D. Ind. filed Mar. 31, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB) and Entry on Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (filed 5/8/14) (granting preliminary injunction requiring Indiana
to recognize Massachusetts marriage of same-sex couple where one spouse suffers terminal cancer);
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (same-sex couple married out of state
sought TRO requiring that death certificate of terminally ill member of couple would list the other
member of the couple as surviving spouse).
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Georgia and Georgia does not recognize Samantha as Alison’s spouse, as
long as Alison is not also survived by any children or grandchildren.141
4. Be careful where you live once you’re married. As discussed above,
Alison can ensure that Samantha could exercise the termination right as
Alison’s widow by choosing to be domiciled in a state that recognizes their
marriage. For most authors, the ability of the author’s spouse to exercise
copyright’s termination right after the author’s death seems unlikely to be
the deciding factor in choosing where to live.142 (Of course, the author and
her spouse may find states that will recognize them as married more
attractive relocation possibilities than nonrecognition states, given that
recognition will likely provide many marital benefits beyond those related
to copyright termination.) But being able to take advantage of the
termination right might make a difference for some authors at the margin,
particularly if an author has a choice of where to live. For example, when
Alison and Samantha consider moving from Massachusetts to warmer
climes, in comparing Atlanta and Hawai’i, the fact that one of those states
will recognize them as a married couple might have some weight in their
decision. A careful choice of domicile might also be relevant if the author
has more than one home. If Alison and Samantha don’t simply move to
Atlanta, but instead buy a home there in addition to their home in
Massachusetts, they may be able through some planning to make sure that
they remain domiciled in Massachusetts, even while spending winters in
Atlanta.

141

If Alison does have any children or grandchildren, she might be advised to talk with them
about her wish that they share with Samantha any income that results if they exercise the termination
interest and reclaim the rights that Alison transferred to BigPubCo. Her wishes would not bind the
children, but they might respect those wishes, and presumably that chances that they will do so are
greater if Alison expressly communicates those wishes than if she does not.
Alison might also consider ensuring in her will that Samantha is Alison’s successor to Alison’s
contractual rights with BigPubCo. This will ensure that, after her death, whatever royalty payments
BigPubCo has been making to Alison will be made to Samantha. It might also help if Samantha will
not be able to exercise the termination right because she is not recognized by Georgia as Alison’s
widow and Alison is survived by children who would be entitled to exercise the termination right.
Having succeeded to Alison’s contractual relationship with BigPubCo, Samantha could attempt to
renegotiate a better deal with BigPubCo. If Samantha and BigPubCo rescind the original contract and
enter into a new one, current case law would indicate that Alison’s children might then not be able to
terminate Alison’s original transfer to BigPubCo because it is no longer in existence. See, e.g.,
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008). In the decided cases, the party
making the rescission and novation with the original transferree was someone who would have been
entitled to exercise the statutory termination right, so it is possible that a court might not treat
Samantha’s rescission and novation in this circumstance as having the same effect of preventing any
subsequent statutory termination.
142 As Baude notes, “[m]ost couples choose to marry someplace where their marriage is
recognized, but may have less opportunity to choose where they live on that basis.” Baude, supra
note 57, at 1417.
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As a practical matter, if Alison has any children, this is the only step
that she can take to guarantee under current law that Samantha will be
entitled to exercise at least part of the termination right after Alison dies.
For most authors, the provisions of copyright law are entirely irrelevant to
the choice of where to live, because copyright law will treat most authors
the same regardless of the state in which they reside. But if authors with
same-sex partners want the same treatment that authors with different-sex
partners get, they must choose carefully where to make their home.
CONCLUSION
On its face, the Copyright Act makes no distinction that treats gay and
lesbian authors differently than other authors. But for nearly four decades,
copyright’s facially neutral termination of transfer provisions have operated
to disadvantage gay and lesbian authors. Throughout this entire period, a
gay or lesbian author has found it either impossible or often very difficult to
ensure that the author’s same-sex partner would be able to exercise the
termination interest if the author died before the termination notice window
opens. Authors with different-sex partners, by contrast, have had virtually
no difficulty in securing the termination interest for their surviving partners.
The Copyright Act’s facially neutral language has resulted in unequal
treatment primarily because the statute’s choice-of-law rule on marriage
recognition has incorporated by reference state marriage laws that deny
same-sex couples the right to marry or to be recognized as married. For the
first 25 years after the current Copyright Act came into effect, state law in
the United States uniformly denied marriage to same-sex couples, so
copyright law uniformly refused to recognize the same-sex partner of a gay
or lesbian author as the author’s surviving spouse. Once states began to
allow same-sex couples to marry in 2004, copyright law still uniformly
refused to recognize even surviving same-sex spouses of gay and lesbian
authors as widows or widowers, because DOMA overrode the Copyright
Act’s marriage recognition rule. When the Windsor Court struck down
section 3 of DOMA, it enabled the Copyright Act finally to recognize some
same-sex surviving spouses as widows and widowers, but it did so
unevenly. Copyright law’s marriage-recognition rule reflected the uneven
treatment of same-sex couples under state law throughout the United States:
an author fortunate enough to live (and die) domiciled in any marriageequality state would find her surviving same-sex spouse recognized for
copyright purposes, while an author who died while domiciled in any other
state would still find her spouse denied federal recognition. Whether this
continuing unequal treatment of gay and lesbian authors will end in the near
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future likely depends on whether the Supreme Court rules in Obergefell that
the federal Constitution requires states to allow same-sex couples to marry.
Even if the Court delivers such a decision in Obergefell, the Copyright
Act’s choice-of-law rule for marriage recognition will continue to treat gay
and lesbian authors unequally when authors die domiciled in jurisdictions
outside the United States that do not recognize those authors’ marriages to
same-sex partners. Those who care about copyright law and marriage
equality should advocate for Congress to amend the statute to recognize an
author’s marriage to a same-sex spouse as long as the marriage was valid
where it was entered into. At least until gay men and lesbians are able to
marry a same-sex spouse everywhere in the world, an extremely generous
recognition rule will bring U.S. copyright law as close as it can come to
treating gay and lesbian authors and their spouses with full equality, and
will relieve authors who live outside the United States of the burden of
having to be careful about where they live when they die.
A decision in favor of marriage equality in Obergefell would represent
substantial progress toward equal treatment for gay and lesbian Americans.
For gay and lesbian authors it would secure almost fully equal treatment
under copyright law, because copyright’s unequal treatment has stemmed
from the determination of an author’s marital status. But even if a favorable
decision in Obergefell brings gay and lesbian authors full equal treatment
under copyright law, it will not bring them full equal treatment under law
more broadly. Obergefell may allow gay and lesbian authors to marry in
every state in the union and have their spouses recognized by copyright law.
But in most of those states, those authors can still be fired from their jobs,
or evicted from their homes, or denied service by a business simply for
being gay or lesbian. Marriage equality would bring a successful end to a
four-decade journey toward equal treatment under copyright law. But it
would only be one (albeit very significant) step toward the goal of a legal
system that treats all people equally regardless of their sexual orientation.
Outside of the copyright system, substantial work will remain to be done in
order to achieve full equality.
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